Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1995

Dee Henshaw v. Utah State Department of
Transportation and Irene Sweeney : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Charles A. Schultz; Ralph L. Finlayson; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Attorney General;
Attorneys for Appellant. John A. Anderson; Matthew M. Durham; Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall &
McCarthy; Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Henshaw v. Utah State Department of Transportation, No. 950087 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6434

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DEE HENSHAW,
Plaint if f/Appeiiee~
vs.

Case No. 950087-CA

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION and IRENE
SWEENEY,

(Civil No. 920900687 CN)

De f endan t s /Jkppeila»fc-s

(Priority No. 15)

BRIEF OP APPELLEES
Appeal From Order Granting Motion to Dismiss or
Summary Judgment in the Third Judicial District,
a Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
UTAH COURT OF

r

Duw

,cTNO. ftOCftl

JOHN A. ANDERSON (4464)
MATTHEW M. DURHAM (6214)
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
Attorneys for Defendants/AppetiaBfcs AQQ&liiCS

CHARLES A. SCHULTZ
Attorney for Appellant Dee Henshaw
P.O. Box 526382
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-6382
Telephone: (801) 466-7308
RALPH L. FINLAYSON (1076)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
4120 State Office Building, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0811
Telephone: (801) 538-9500
Attorneys for .Appellee
.Appal l e e -

Fill
APR 101895
COURT OF

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DEE HENSHAW,
Plaintiff/Appellee
vs.

Case No. 950087-CA

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION and IRENE
SWEENEY,

(Civil No. 920900687 CN)

Defendants/Appellant.

(Priority No. 15)

BRIEF OF APPELLEES
Appeal From Order Granting Motion to Dismiss or
Summary Judgment in the Third Judicial District,
the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
JOHN A. ANDERSON (4464)
MATTHEW M. DURHAM (6214)
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
CHARLES A. SCHULTZ
Attorney for Appellant Dee Henshaw
P.O. Box 526382
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-6382
Telephone: (801) 466-7308
RALPH L. FINLAYSON (1076)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
4120 State Office Building, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0811
Telephone: (801) 538-9500
Attorneys for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

STATEMENT OF CASE
A.
B.

3
3

Nature of Case
Statement of Facts and Course of
Proceedings

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT

6
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED
THAT NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT
EXISTED TO PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT . . . .
A.

B.

II.

B.

C.

6

There is no dispute as to the
date Appellant's alleged cause of
action for fraud accrued
....

THE COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ESTOPPED FROM
RAISING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS NOR
THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS
NOT TOLLED BY APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO
DISCOVER ANY ALLEGED INJURY
A.

233X74055

The date of Sweeney's alleged
breach of contract is not in
dispute

6

11

Appellant had actual knowledge of
any alleged breach of contract or
fraud by July 1985

11

Appellant cannot raise an
estoppel by pleading inconsistent
facts

12

The Discovery Rule offers
Appellant no support because he
knew or should have known of any
alleged breach or fraud before
the limitations period had run . . . .

13

1.

2.

CONCLUSION

233\74055 1

Appellant knew of his causes
of action before limitations
period ran

15

Appellant cannot rely upon
the discovery rule to toll
the statues of limitations
because he failed to act
reasonably to protect his
rights

17
20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1192 (Utah 1993)

.

2, 9, 19

Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311, 314 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) .

15

Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 492-93
(Utah Ct. App. 1994)

14

Kinyon v. Cardon, 686 P.2d 1048, 1052 n.3
(Or. Ct. App. 1984)

12

Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 874-75
(10th Cir. 1982)

9

McConkie v. Hartman, 529 P.2d 801, 801-02 (Utah 1974) . . 9, 19
Myers v, McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981)

....

13, 15

Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
321 U.S. 342, 348-49, 64 S. Ct. 582, 586 (1944) .

13

Rice v. Granite Sch. Dist., 456 P.2d 159, 163 (Utah 1969) .

15

Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105, 107 (Utah 1978)

15

Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129
(Utah 1992)

14, 17

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1994) . . . . 1
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1994) . .

1, 5

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1

2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23

2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26

2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3)

9

233V74055 1

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
John A. Anderson (44 64)
Matthew M. Durham (6214)
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Irene Sweeney
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
/r
Telephone
532-3333
IN THE UTAH COURT Or APPEALS
DEE HENSH AVI,

)
)
)

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vc~

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
IRENE SWEENEY

)

UTAH DEPARTME:.,
r
TRANSPORTATION. a political
subdivision of the State of
Utah, and TREN^ SWEENEY,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants/Appellees.

)

Appeal No. 950078-CA

^*~ ISD1CTJ.U*
This appeal was initially filed Jn the Utah Supreme
Court pursuant *
Supp. lyyi.) ,

'" -' Joue Ar-.

(Mir-tiin 19 9?! &

.._ , .. « , ^oiir1" c: Appea i J ix^o jurisdiction over

this matter pursuant

* ~ l:i /;: Code An:.. § "8 2-2(4) (Michie 1392

& Supp. 19:94) .
STATEMEMT

C F

I S S U E S

XH2

STANDARD

0F

REVIEW

The following issues are presented for review on this
appeal:
1

Did the district court correctly conclude that
there was no issue of material fact as to when
Appellant's causes of action against Appellee
Irene Sweeney arose?

233X74055.1

1

2.

Did the district court correctly conclude that
Appellant's claims against Appellee Irene
Sweeney were barred by the relevant statutes of
limitations?

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the facts
and all reasonable inferences are viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party.
1188, 1192 (Utah 1993).
correctness.

Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d

Questions of law are reviewed for

Id.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 provides:
Civil actions may be commenced only within the
periods prescribed in this chapter, after the
cause of action has accrued, except in specific
cases where a different limitation is prescribed
by statute.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 provides:
Within six years:
(2) An action upon any contract,
obligation, or liability founded upon an
instrument in writing, except those
mentioned in Section 78-12-22.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 provides:
Within three years:
(3) An action for relief on the ground of
fraud or mistake; except that the cause of
action in such case does not accrue until
the discovery by the aggrieved party of the
facts constituting the fraud or mistake.

233\74055 1
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STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

.aiuiL, wi a s e

Tins case involves a dispute over the sale of a
parcel c: **• •] property in Emigration Canyon, Salt Lake ?^inr* -

; opei ty")

Appel] ai r

• - -..-s

and Appellee Irene Sweeney ("Sweeney""; entered into an
executory Uniform Real Estate Centra-"-

:r>-~. M ^or.trar* "

.L-'

~^r rne
- -l->:"

:

-i

had previously been deeded to Sweeney by Appellee Utah
Department of Transportat i <v
d e t r a - . s.

"UDOT"), and other portions were

I: :i :i i

Appellant contends that UDOT did not have clear title
• - ""he py-^p^-K-r
JO::-. .

, ••

deeded *
. _..\^

9ween~\

.'IL^^--L^-

d which Sweeney
Appellant asserts that

beginning . n . ,. >• ]v8:-, Sweeney refused to accept payments
under the Contract.

He furt~:~—~ ----i1-

j1

the Contract and transferred the riop^Ly ^
notice to Appellant.

,-._...

*—-iqrned

;D^r wiLnout

Appellant claims that he repeatedly

tendered r^vm^-r- for the Pre :"••* •"'
Appe

"•• •

' •.'••-•' --.

'.

.ncjaes, however, that lie was aavisec .in March 1986

that Sweeney had transferred the Property t :• UDOT.

M e r t y b \ » w a i r a i 11 >

a dm i t s t h at he obtained c'i«""^
deed from UDOT i n August

He further

. . t..
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B.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings

1.

On or about May 27, 1976, Appellant and Sweeney

entered into the Contract for the purchase of certain real
property located in Emigration Canyon, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah.

(R. at 53 1 10).
2.

Appellant alleges that at the time Sweeney

executed the Contract she was aware that she did not have clear
title to all the Property to be conveyed under the Contract.
Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that Sweeney intentionally
misrepresented to him that she had clear title to the Property
and had the power and ability to convey the Property to him by
means of a warranty deed. (Id. at 59 ^
3.

43-45) .

All or part of the Property subject to the

Contract had previously been deeded to Sweeney by UDOT, but
UDOT did not have clear title to such property.

(Id. at 54 ^|

13-14) .
4.

In July 1985, Appellant tendered to Sweeney all

payments due under the Contract, but Sweeney refused to accept
such payments and failed to provide Appellant with a warranty
deed and title insurance to the Property.

(.Id. at 54, 58

UK 16-17; Brief of Appellant at 37-39) .
5.

On or about November 21, 1985, Sweeney assigned

her interest in the Contract to UDOT.
of this assignment in March 1986.

233X74055 1
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UDOT informed Appellant

(Id. at 54-55 UH 18-19).

6.

In March 1986, Appellant began dealing

exclusively with UDOT with respect to payment obligations under
the Contract.

He asserts that UDOT thereafter failed and

refused to accept his tenders or to deed the Property by
warranty deed to him until August 1991.

(Id. at 55-56 11 20-

24) .
7.

Appellant obtained clear title to the Property

by warranty deed from UDOT in or about August 1991.

(Ld. at 56

1 24) .
8.

Appellant commenced this action by filing his

Complaint on or after January 28, 1992.
9.

(.Id. at 19).

On March 27, 1992, Sweeney filed a Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint.

(R. at 74-76).

On March 31,

1993, the District Court dismissed with prejudice Appellant's
Complaint as to Sweeney. (R. at 218-22).
10.

On October 25, 1994, Appellant filed his Notice

of Appeal. (R. at 594-95).
11.

On March 1, 1995, Appellant filed its brief with

the Utah Supreme Court of Appeals.

This appeal was transferred

to the Utah court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(4) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant argues on appeal that the District Court
erred in concluding he initiated this action outside the
relevant limitation periods for his claims against Sweeney.

233\74055 1
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He

further argues that Sweeney should be estopped from asserting
the statute of limitation because she concealed facts necessary
to put Appellant on notice of his cause of action.
Additionally, he argues that the District Court erred as a
matter of law in holding that the relevant statutes of
limitation were not tolled by Appellant's failure to discover
his injury.
Appellant's arguments are without merit.

Appellant's

own statements indicate that any breach of contract or fraud
alleged by Appellant arose in July, 1985.

Consequently,

Appellant brought his actions outside the relevant limitations
periods.

Moreover, the District Court correctly concluded that

the "discovery rule" did not apply in this case for at least
two reasons.

First, Appellant concedes that he was aware of

any injury during the relevant limitation period.

Second, in

light of the facts presented, Appellant failed to act
reasonably in investigating his claim and protecting his
rights.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT NO
GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTED TO
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A.

The date of Sweeney's alleged breach of
contract is not in dispute

On appeal, Appellant asserts that Sweeney's breach of
the Contract did not occur until March 1986, when he claims
that UDOT informed him of Sweeney's assignment of the Contract
233X74055 1

_

to UDOT.

(Brief of Appellant at 32-34.)

This argument,

rejected by the trial court, is directly contrary to the
evidence, including Appellant's own sworn statements.
In his Amended Complaint, Appellant alleges that
"beginning in June of 1985" he repeatedly tendered to Sweeney
the balance owing under the Contract for the purchase of the
Property.

(R. at 54 K 15). Appellant further alleges

"beginning in July 1985, Sweeney would no longer accept
[Appellant's] payments on the property and would not discuss a
payoff with the [Appellant.]"

(Id. at 59 f 16).

After Sweeney raised the statute of limitations,
Appellant backtracked by asserting that Sweeney "never actually
stated that she would not accept a final payoff" of the
Contract balance.

(Xd. at 102.)

Appellant's statements are,

however, hopelessly inconsistent.

In the same memorandum in

which he claims Sweeney never stated she would not accept final
payoff, he also states that in approximately July of 1985,
Sweeney refused to accept payments under the Contract, and that
by August or September of 1985, Sweeney would not even discuss
the Property with Appellant.

(Id. at 99-100).

These

allegations are buttressed by Appellant's sworn affidavit,
submitted with the Memorandum.

(Affidavit of Dee Henshaw,

April 10, 1992, R. at 114-115A).
In addition to being internally inconsistent,
Appellants assertions are immaterial and do not indicate error

233X74055 1
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by the District Court.

Appellant confuses the issues of when

the breach occurred, and when Appellant allegedly discovered
the breach.

Appellant admits that in March 1986 UDOT informed

him that Sweeney had assigned the Contract and transferred the
Property to UDOT.

(R. at 55, 100 % 15, 115 HH 9-11).

At most,

however, this fact indicates when Appellant learned of the
breach, not when the breach actually occurred.

The breach

occurred when Sweeney refused to accept payments and discuss
the Property with Appellant, and the statute of limitation
began to run at that time.

Appellant's statements regarding

what he heard from UDOT in March 1986 are immaterial to the
question of when the alleged breach of contract occurred.
For example, the essential material facts, which are
not in dispute, are that by August or September of 1985,
Appellant knew that Sweeney would not accept payments under the
Contract and, in fact, would not even discuss the Property with
Appellant.

Even taking these facts in the light most favorable

to Appellant, the inescapable conclusion is that any alleged
breach of the Contract must have occurred by that time.
Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that no
genuine issue of material fact existed as to the date of
Sweeney's alleged breach of the Contract.

233\74055 1
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B.

There is no dispute as to the date
Appellant's alleged cause of action for
fraud accrued

Appellant also claims that his cause of action for
fraud is not barred by the three-year statute of limitations
contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3), because he did not
discover until the Spring of 1991 that Sweeney did not have
clear title to the Property.1

Once again, however, Appellant

relies upon the assertion of immaterial facts and assumptions
in an attempt to avoid summary judgment.
A cause of action for fraud accrues when the
plaintiff knows, or has reason to know the facts constituting
the fraud.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3); see also Loveridge v.

Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 874-75 (10th Cir. 1982) (applying Utah
law).

Appellant's claim that he did not know until 1991 that

Sweeney did not have clear title to the Property is completely
untenable in light of the facts of this case.
Appellant could have discovered in 1976 that Sweeney
did not have clear title to the Property.

A prudent purchaser

would have discovered the clouded title upon examining the
records in the county recorder's office.

Baldwin v. Burton,

850 P.2d 1188, 1195-96 (Utah 1993); McConkie v. Hartman, 529
P.2d 801, 801-02 (Utah 1974).

Appellant could have discovered

again in 1979 that Sweeney did not have clear title to the

Henshaw's claims regarding the applicability of the
"discovery rule" to his fraud claim is discussed in greater
detail in Section II, infra.
233\74055 1

9

Property.

It was in 1979 that Appellant filed the Contract

with the County Recorder in the same records that indicated
that a third party claimed an interest to the Property.

(R. at

54 H 11). At the very latest, Appellant was on notice that he
should examine the relevant property records in July of 1985,
when Sweeney allegedly told him that "she was working with her
attorney and with UDOT to resolve problems with the property,
so that she could give Thim] a warranty deed to the property."
(R. at 114 H 6)(emphasis added).

In August or September of

1985, Sweeney refused to talk to Appellant about the Property.
According to Appellant, she stated at that time that she was
working with UDOT to resolve problems with the Property.

(Id.

at 114-15 1 7) .
Plaintiff had constructive notice in 1976 and 1979
that a third party claimed an interest to the Property.

He was

certainly on notice by late 1985 that there were "problems with
the Property" that precluded Sweeny from conveying the Property
under a warranty deed.

At the very least, Appellant was on

notice that he should investigate the status of title to the
Property.

Appellant's failure to act to protect his rights is

not sufficient ground to claim a bar to the three-year statute
of limitations for fraud.

Accordingly, the trial court did not

err in concluding that Appellant's fraud claims were timebarred.

233\74055 1
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II.

THE COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED PLAINTIFF WAS NOT
ESTOPPED FROM RAISING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
NOR THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS NOT
TOLLED BY APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO DISCOVER ANY
ALLEGED INJURY

Appellant claims that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment because Sweeney was estopped from
raising the time bar or because the relevant statutes of
limitations were tolled by Appellant's failure to discover
Sweeney's alleged breach and fraud.

He claims that this

failure to discover resulted from Sweeney's concealing: (1) her
conveyance of the deed to the Property to UDOT, as well as her
assignment of her rights under the Contract; and (2) her
intentions not to convey the Property to Appellant.
Appellants arguments are unavailing on at least three
grounds.

First, despite Appellant's protestations to the

contrary, the undisputed facts show that he was aware of any
alleged breach by July 1985.

Second, any factual consistencies

are the result, not of Sweeny's representations, but of
Appellant's inconsistent pleadings and assertions which cannot
form the basis of estoppel.

Finally, Appellant cannot rely

upon the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations
because Appellant failed to act reasonably in light of the
facts contained in his Amended Complaint and other pleadings.
A.

Appellant had actual knowledge of any alleged
breach of contract or fraud by July 1985

As discussed above, Appellant was fully aware of any
alleged breach or fraud in July of 1985.
233\74055 1

Appellant alleged in

his Amended Complaint that at that point, Sweeney had refused
to accept payments from or even discuss the Property with him.
(R. at 54 U 16-17).

Appellant affirmed this fact in his

memorandum in opposition to Sweeney's motion to dismiss.

(Id.

at 99-100, 114-15 %% 6-7). Appellant's tortured argument that
he did not know of any breach or fraud because Sweeney never
explicitly said she would not consummate the sale is merely a
transparent attempt to avoid the statutes of limitations
applicable to his claims.

Because he had actual knowledge of

any alleged breach of contract or fraud by July 1985, his
appeal should be denied on this ground.
B.

Appellant cannot raise an estoppel by
pleading inconsistent facts

The only inconsistency regarding representations made
by Sweeney in connection with the Property arise from
inconsistent facts asserted by Appellant.

Appellant may not,

however, claim estoppel by himself asserting inconsistent
facts.

Kinyon v. Cardon, 686 P.2d 1048, 1052 n.3 (Or. Ct. App.

1984) .
In his Amended Complaint, Appellant claimed that in
July 1985, Sweeney refused to accept any payments under the
Contract or to discuss the Property with Appellant.
H 16-17).

(R. at 54

Once Sweeney raised her limitations defense,

however, Appellant changed his story.

In his opposition

memorandum Appellant claimed that although she would not
discuss payoff or the Property, she never actually refused an
233X74055 1
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early payoff.

(Id. at 99-100, 114-15 %% 7-8) (emphasis added).

To the extent that these facts are inconsistent, the
inconsistency was created not by Sweeney, but by Appellant in
his attempt to avoid the statutes of limitations.

Accordingly,

Appellant's appeal should be denied on this ground.
C.

The Discovery Rule offers Appellant no
support because he knew or should have
known of any alleged breach or fraud before
the limitations period had run

Appellant attempts to rely upon the "discovery rule"
to toll the relevant statutes of limitations until the time he
claims to have discovered his causes of action.

This reliance

is not well placed, because Appellant knew or should have known
of his alleged causes of action before the respective
limitations periods had run, and failed to act reasonably to
investigate his claim and protect his rights.
Generally, a cause of action must be brought within
the relevant limitations period.

Statutes of limitations are

designed "to promote justice by preventing surprises through
the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared."

Myers v, McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981)

(quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49, 64 S. Ct. 582, 586 (1944)). The
discovery rule, an exception to this general principle, tolls
the statute of limitations until the time that plaintiffs
discover the facts necessary to bring their claims.
233X74055 1

The Utah

courts have recognized at least three applications of the
discovery rule:

(1) when the rule is mandated by statute; (2)

when a defendant has concealed the cause of action or otherwise
misled the plaintiff; and (3) when exceptional circumstance
would make application of the statue of limitations irrational
or unjust.

Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129

(Utah 1992); Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 492-93
(Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Appellant apparently relies upon the "concealment"
branch of the discovery rule to toll the relevant statutes of
limitations.2

See (Brief of Appellant at 36-37).

Appellant

claims that Sweeney prevented him from discovering his causes
of action by concealing the fact that she did not have clear
title to the Property, by concealing her assignment of the
Contract and transfer of the property to UDOT, and by
"continually representing that she would consummate the sale of
the property to Appellant."

Id.

These assertions do not bring

Appellant within the "concealment" branch of the discovery rule
for at least two reasons.

First, Appellant discovered any

alleged cause of action before the limitations period had
ended.

Second, the discovery rule protects only those

plaintiff's who act reasonably in protecting their rights.

2

There appears to be no statute mandating application
of the discovery rule in this case. Additionally, Appellant has
suggested no "exceptional circumstances" that would make the
application of the statute of limitations irrational or unjust.
233X74055 1

14

1.

Appellant knew of his causes of action
before limitations period ran

Even assuming that Sweeney initially concealed her
breach of contract or fraud, as Appellant alleges, he admits
that he knew of the breach in March, 1986. (R. at 55 1 19f 101,
115 H 11). The fact that Appellant learned of Sweeney's
alleged breach during the limitations period, but failed to
act, distinguishes this case from every "discovery rule" case
cited by Appellant, and precludes him from relying upon the
rule.

See Myers, 635 P.2d at 87 (plaintiffs unaware of ward's

death until limitations period for wrongful death had run);
Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105, 107 (Utah 1978)
(plaintiffs, misled by defendant, did not know cause of injury
until after period for filing notice of claim expired); Rice v.
Granite Sch. Dist.. 456 P.2d 159, 163 (Utah 1969) (defendant
represented it would pay for plaintiffs injuries until after
limitations period expired); Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311,
314 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (plaintiffs misled by defendant that
property was sold until after limitations period had run).
This court has suggested that a plaintiff who becomes
aware of a cause of action during the limitations period cannot
rely upon the discovery rule to toll the statute even though
the cause of action was initially unknown to the plaintiff.
Butcher, 744 P.2d at 311.

In Butcher, the plaintiffs and the

defendant entered a settlement agreement under which the
defendant had until April 1976 to sell a parcel of property and

split the proceeds with the plaintiffs.

Although all parties

attempted to sell the property, it remained unsold in April
1976.

In March 1982, the defendant sold the property without

notifying the plaintiffs or accounting for their share of the
proceeds.

Unaware of the sale, the plaintiffs continued in

their attempts to sell the property, and kept the defendant
apprised of their efforts.

Rather than informing the

plaintiffs that the property had been sold, the defendant
encouraged them in their efforts.

When the plaintiffs

discovered the sale of the property, they brought an action to
recover their share of the proceeds.

Id. at 812.

The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs would
generally be required to bring their action within six years of
the defendant's failure to sell the property in April 1976.
The court, however, held that because of his conduct and
misrepresentations, the defendant estopped from asserting the
statute of limitations.

Id. at 314.

Significantly, however,

the Court noted that " [h]ad the [plaintiffs] known of the sale
of the property in March 1982, [they] could have sued under the
settlement agreement before their cause of action was barred by
the six-year statue of limitations."

3

Id.3

Had the Butcher plaintiffs known of the sale in March,
1982, they would have had a matter of weeks in which to bring
suit. In contrast, Appellant had several years from learning of
Sweeney's transfer of the Property and assignment of the
Contract to bring his action.
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Unlike the plaintiffs in Butcher, Appellant concedes
that he was aware of Sweeney's alleged breach of contract by
March 1986, well within the limitations period.

Nevertheless,

he failed to bring this action until January 1992, more than
six-years after the alleged breach, and almost five years after
Appellant admits that UDOT informed him that the Contract had
been assigned and the Property transferred to them.

The dicta

in Butcher suggests that Appellant's failure to act to protect
his rights precludes him from raising an estoppel or from
relying upon the discovery rule to toll the statute of
limitations.

Consequently, Appellant's appeal should be

denied.
2.

Appellant cannot rely upon the
discovery rule to toll the statues of
limitations because he failed to act
reasonably to protect his rights

In order to rely upon the "concealment" branch of the
discovery rule, Appellant must have acted reasonably to protect
his rights.

Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d at 1125, 1130

(Utah 1992) Appellant must show that a reasonable plaintiff in
his circumstances would not have brought suit within the
limitations period.

Id.

The Warren case is instructive.

In Warren, the

plaintiff and his family were injured in the crash of a small
plane they had leased.

After the crash, the plaintiff

contacted the defendant city to determine whether the lessor of
the aircraft was insured.
233\74055 1

Id. at 1128.

The defendant did not

return the plaintiff's phone calls or otherwise respond.

More

than a year after the crash, plaintiff again requested
information regarding the lessor's insurance.

At that point,

the defendant informed the plaintiff that the lessor did not
have a certificate of insurance on file and had not responded
to inquiries.

The plaintiff subsequently sued the defendant

for failure to enforce a city ordinance requiring airplanes to
comply with federal regulations.

Id. at 1127-28.

When the defendant raised the statue of limitations
as a defense, the plaintiff claimed he had been prevented by
the defendant's concealment from discovering his cause of
action until after the limitations period.

The claimed

concealment consisted of the defendant's failure to return the
plaintiff's telephone calls.

Id. at 1130.

The court held

that, while a defendant's concealment might under certain
circumstances constitute estoppel tolling the statute of
limitations, it does so only when the plaintiff has undertaken
reasonable efforts to protect its rights.

Id.

The court noted

that while the defendant had not returned the plaintiff's
telephone calls, the plaintiff did not take reasonable steps to
investigate his cause of action.

Consequently, the plaintiff

could not assert the discovery rule to avoid the statute of
limitations.

Id.

In the instant case, Appellant undertook no
reasonable steps to investigate his claims for fraud or breach
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of contract.

He apparently made no investigation of property

records, even though he claims to have filed the Contract
there.

(R. at 54 1 11). A reasonable purchaser would have

made such an investigation.

Baldwin, 850 P.2d at 1195-96;

McConkie, 529 P.2d at 801-02.

Moreover, Sweeney allegedly

refused to accept payments under the Contract and to discuss
the Property with Appellant because there were "problems with
the property" that precluded Sweeney's transferring a warranty
deed to Appellant.

(R. at 100, 114-15 %% 6-7). Nevertheless,

Appellant apparently undertook no efforts to investigate what
these problems might have been.

Even more surprising, when

Appellant was allegedly informed by UDOT in March 1986, well
within the limitations period, that Sweeney had assigned the
Contract and transferred the Property to it, he made no efforts
to protect his rights.
Appellant may claim that, unlike the plaintiff in
Warxen, Sweeney not only concealed Appellant's injury, but
"continually represented" that she would sell him the Property,
and that Appellant reasonably relied upon those
representations.

(See Id. at 104; Brief of Appellant at 37).

This assertion is made, however, only in the unsworn
allegations of Appellant's brief and memorandum in opposition
to Sweeney's motion to dismiss.

No such allegations appear

either in Appellant's Amended Complaint, nor in his sworn
affidavit.

Rather, those documents state that after July 1985,
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Sweeney refused to discuss the Property with Appellant.
54 1111 16-17, 114-15 Uf 16-17) .

(R. at

These unsworn allegations

cannot form the basis of Appellant's assertion of the discovery
rule.
Despite numerous facts that would have placed a
reasonable plaintiff on notice to investigate its claims and
protect its rights, Appellant undertook no effort to do so
until January 1992, more than six years after Sweeney's alleged
breach.

Because Appellant failed to act reasonably in

protecting his rights, he cannot now claim the protection of
the discovery rule.4

Accordingly, Appellant's appeal should

be denied.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's arguments that the District Court erred
in concluding that Appellant brought this action outside the
applicable statute of limitations are unavailing.

Even viewing

the facts in the light most favorable to Appellant, his causes
of action arose in July 1985, more than six years before he
brought this action.

Moreover, his argument that the District

Court erred as a matter of law in not applying the discovery

4

Appellant has apparently not sought the protection of
the "exceptional circumstances" branch of the discovery rule.
This branch would not, however, afford Appellant any relief. A
plaintiff asserting the discovery rule for exceptional
circumstances must also show that it acted reasonably in
investigating its claims and protecting its rights. Warren, 838
P.2d at 1129. As discussed above, Appellant cannot make such a
showing.
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rule to his claim is also without merit.

Appellant knew of any

causes of action within the relevant limitation period.
Consequently, the discovery rule does not apply.

Additionally,

Appellant cannot rely on any concealment by Sweeney to assert
the discovery rule, because he failed to act reasonably in
investigating his claims or protecting his rights.
Accordingly, Appellant's appeal of the District Court's order
granting dismissal should be denied.
DATED this

\jCfi— day of April, 1995.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
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John A. Anderson
Matthew M. Durham
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